This online supplement contains peer-reviewed material that would not fit in the PSA 2010 Proceedings article, Twardy and Korb (2011) . That article presents a probabilistic extension of active-path analyses of actual causation. The extension uses "soft" interventions as the analog of resetting path variables to their actual value. Soft interventions allow the "actual value" to be a probability distribution. The resulting account can handle at least as wide a range of examples as the original accounts, without assuming determinism. In the extended bottle-smashing model, Suzy's throw ST = 1 remains an actual cause of BS = 1 using a redundancy range to reveal the dependency. Choosing {BT, BH} as our background, and setting BH = 0, we see that ST makes a difference. Resetting has no effect because actually SH = 1. † Charles R. Twardy, C
A Additional Detail
In the extended bottle-smashing model, Suzy's throw ST = 1 remains an actual cause of BS = 1 using a redundancy range to reveal the dependency. Choosing {BT, BH} as our background, and setting BH = 0, we see that ST makes a difference. Resetting has no effect because actually SH = 1. Figure 4 shows the model for the deterministic version of Trainee Assassin presented in Section 4.2. Recall that Trainee T shoots at a victim V , but Supervisor will shoot if Trainee loses nerve. Being deterministic, Victim survives only when neither shot is fired. In the actual case, the trainee shoots, the supervisor does not, and the victim dies. As with Boulder, there is no marginal effect, but any path-based account works, because the path T −− V is strongly active. 
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T = 1 S = ¬T V = ¬T ∧ ¬S
B The Background is Not a Cause
The redundancy range analysis of Hitchcock amounts to asserting that the background is not a cause, which leads to a unified notation for treating cause and context.
where notionally, x is the cause c, y is the contrast c and z is the actual background. Then:
If c (vs c ) is an actual cause of e, there must be a redundant background b where c vs c makes a difference. Asserting redundancy amounts to saying the background b vs actual background b is not itself a cause:
The condition is trivially satisfied if b = b . An implication is that if c is a cause, ε is constrained by the relative probabilities of c vs c and b vs b . − − D, then everything proceeds as before, and D makes a difference; but F does not make a difference, because the direct arc F −− S is inactive (by setting b : D = 1), and we have no background variable that could block F −− S and isolate F −− D −− S. However, if we add noise at S, so that ducking no longer guarantees survival, we find an influence for F . Suppose that the conditional probability table (CPT) at S is:
C Probabilistic Boulder
Given that the hiker ducked, F = 1 reduces the chances of survival relative to F = 0, as we can see in figure 3 . But that is just what we would expect. Of course, F = 1 is not an actual cause of S = 1. It is rather a counterfactual cause of S = 0 -i.e., a counterfactual preventer of S = 1. By always requiring that actually E = e (S = 1 in this case), the accounts of Halpern & Pearl and Hitchcock deny F in this case the status of actual cause. PAP, however, finds it to be active, which we consider to be more appropriate. The awkwardness of calling a Falling Boulder an actual cause of Survival, when its activity all pulls in the opposite direction, is handled in English by such locutions as: "The hiker survived despite the boulder falling." The existence of such locutions supports, rather than undermines, the status of falling boulders as actual causes in such cases. The inclusion of the clause requiring for actual causation that E = e is an attempt to cater for ordinary linguistic practices, which is out of place in analyses of causal metaphysics, as we have previously suggested (Twardy and .
D The Voting Machine
The To review Halpern & Pearl's analysis, consider V 1 . In the actual background V 2 = 1, and V 1 made no difference. Let V 2 = 0, which is clearly in the redundancy range. Now V 1 = 0 results in P = 0, but V 1 = 1 results in P = 1 even if (only if!) M is reset to its actual state, M = 1. So V 1 = 1 is an actual cause, and by symmetry, so is V 2 = 1. We can match their result, but we think the solution is not entirely satisfactory. On this analysis, V 1 = 1 would be an actual cause no matter how many other votes were cast: setting all other votes to 0 is still in the redundancy range. But as the number of votes N goes to infinity, the conclusion becomes increasingly implausible.
As before, we might seek refuge in probabilities, but to no avail. Suppose that all votes are in favor, but that each vote has a 10% chance of being tallied as against the measure. Whether that 10% is the chance of voting against the measure or being incorrectly tallied should not matter. For the case with two votes, consider V 1 :
.09 0 Redundant: V 2 = 0 .9 .09 V 1 is an actual cause for all reasonable values of ε. If ε < .09, then V 1 is an actual cause in the actual background, because it has a small ∆ 1 that is nevertheless greater than ε. If ε is greater than that, but less than 0.9, then V 1 is an actual cause in a redundant background, where it has a large effect. We think that ε > 0.9 is not reasonable. The general case with N positive votes can be treated as a binomial experiment with N trials, each with probability of success p. Therefore the mean and variance of M are µ = N p, and σ 2 = N p(1 − p). Let q = 1 − p, in our case, 0.1. The probability the measure will fail is q N , and the difference made by 1 vote is roughly q N −1 , which becomes vanishingly small. The distribution for 4 votes is shown here:
For ε = 0, of course each vote is an actual cause, but with a contribution rapidly approaching 0. For all numbers of positive votes N , for moderate ε < p, each vote is still an actual cause. This is because we can always find a redundant background of k opposing votes where ∆ 2 < ε, but where the loss of one more vote (V 1 ) makes ∆ 1 > ε. This is because the counterfactual change from N to N = N − k positive votes will be an order of magnitude smaller than the subsequent change to N − 1 positive votes. However, for a fixed ε, as N gets larger, the plausibility of N becomes smaller. In the case where N = 10, the counterfactual N = 4 has only a .014% chance (.00014 probability) of occurring. It would seem that the binary judgment of "actual cause" has to be supplemented with a notion of causal strength (see, e.g., .
